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Panel Two-The Capital Jury
A second major emphasis of the Massachusetts Governor's Council Report is to
improve the quality of jury deliberation in capital cases. This goal is served primarily
by recommendations four, five, and seven.
Participants: Craig M. Bradley (moderator), Nancy J. King, Andrew D. Leipold, Erik
Lillquist, Andrea D. Lyon, Steven J. Sherman, Scott E. Sundby
STRATEGY AND REMORSE IN CAPITAL TRIALS
Andrew D. Leipold
I will focus not on the huge number of things that I find commendable and
absolutely right about the Council's Report, but on the couple of things about which I
still have questions. Let me very briefly say something about each of the three
recommendations that our panel is assigned to discuss.
Recommendation four is that the defendant be allowed to have two different juries,
one at the guilt stage and a different one at the sentencing stage. The goal is to avoid
putting the defendant in a strategic bind: if he vigorously contests guilt at the trial,
perhaps even by denying involvement in the crime, it then becomes practically
impossible for him to credibly accept responsibility and show remorse at the penalty
phase. Having a second jury hear only the penalty phase removes this dilemma, and
allows the defendant to choose his strongest strategy at each stage of the proceedings.
I have strong doubts that this is a strategic option worth preserving. Defendants
should not, of course, be penalized for using every legitimate means of contesting guilt.
But it is quite different to say that we should allow defendants to conceal from the
sentencing jury relevant information that might bear directly on punishment. The
sentencing jury is wrestling not just with a legal question, but also with a factual one:
Does the defendant in fact feel remorse, and does he in fact accept responsibility for
his crime? These are highly important considerations for jurors, and to prevent them
from seeing the defendant's demeanor and perhaps hearing his testimony at the guilt
stage deprives them of potentially critical information. If the jury believes the
defendant lied at trial, or improperly tried to blame the victim, or falsely tried to shift
responsibility to a codefendant, this can and should affect the sentencing jury's
judgment on the sincerity of the claimed remorse. Everyone is sorry after they are
found guilty; observing the defendant before that point, therefore, can add significantly
to the jurors' understanding of the person they will sentence.
Lawyers will recall that the Supreme Court has faced a related question in non-
capital cases, namely, whether criminal defendants should be allowed to argue in the
alternative: "I didn't intend to commit the crime, but if I did, then I was entrapped by
the government." In Mathews v. United States [485 U.S. 58 (1988)], the Court said that
there was no reason a criminal defendant should be prevented from arguing
inconsistent positions, but it reached this conclusion in part because the jury would be
able to watch the defendant take conflicting positions and draw the appropriate
inferences. This is the missing step that makes me disfavor the recommendation.
One response to my concern may be that criminal defendants "accept responsibility"
for their actions all the time when they plead guilty in return for sentencing
concessions, and we rarely pause in those cases to ask if the defendant is really sorry
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for the harm caused. But here I think death truly is different, because the capital
sentencing decision is different from anything else thatjuries normally do. In trying to
create a world of guided discretion for capital decisions, we should give juries every
opportunity to sort defendants by levels of blameworthiness, and we can do that in part
by giving the jury more rather than less information about the actual level of remorse.
Recommendation five involves special jury instructions for capital cases, in
particular, eyewitness testimony. Here I applaud the Commission's recommendation,
because this is a troublesome area and something clearly needs to be.done. My only
question is whether this recommendation can be restricted to capital cases. If these
instructions really create a more accurate and fair trial, is there even a rational basis to
deny the same instruction in a non-capital case? I doubt that there is, and while this is
probably a desirable change in non-capital trials, it illustrates the difficulty of trying to
sell some of these recommendations as being small changes to a limited number of
cases.
Recommendation seven requires a heightened burden of proof at the sentencing
stage, requiring the jury to find "no doubt" about the defendant's guilt before imposing
the death penalty, having previously found at the trial stage that the defendant was
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." This recommendation purports to give jurors an
opportunity to give effect to any "residual doubt" that they have about whether the
defendant committed the crime.
This recommendation is problematic on a number of levels. First, to the extent the
jurors have genuine, non-trivial doubts about the defendant's guilt, they should have
acquitted in the first instance. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is notoriously hard to
define, but it should at least mean that when a juror votes to convict, he or she is
certain enough of guilt to make it morally appropriate to keep the defendant in prison
for the rest of his life. Stated differently, if there is some lingering doubt-as long as it
is reasonable and legitimate-the time to give voice to these misgivings is at trial.
Second, even assuming the appropriateness of asking a jury to apply a higher level
of proof at sentencing, I question whether juries will be able draw a meaningful line
between the two standards. People who practice criminal law know what a heroic
assumption it is that jurors understand the instructions we give them now, especially
(but not exclusively) as it relates to the burden of proof. To tell jurors that they now
have to apply a differently-worded standard, one that is supposedly higher than
reasonable doubt-which many jurors probably, and reasonably, assumed at the guilt
stage was the highest standard available-is likely to be futile at best, and bewildering
at worst.
As a result, I strongly suspect that a "no doubt" standard will not lead to more
accurate or fair results, but instead will serve a different role. My concern is that the
instruction will simply serve as a vehicle for jurors to express feelings that are
unrelated to whether the defendant before them presents an appropriate case for the
death penalty. Confusion about the hair-splitting differences in standards, feelings of
anxiety about the enormity of the decision before them, and other "whimsical"
concerns (to borrow language from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) are
likely to find an outlet in the "no doubt" instruction. If limiting the number of death
sentences for its own sake is the goal, the proposed instruction will help. But if
accuracy of outcomes and guiding juries in the exercise of their discretion is the goal,
this instruction is a step in the wrong direction.
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